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Does This Piece Fit?: A Look at the Importation of the
Common-Law Quitclaim Deed and After-Acquired Title
Doctrine into Louisiana's Civil Code
I. INTRODUCTION
0
Modem civilian method often calls upon the courts to develop
jurisprudential precepts .... In the promulgation or revision of a civil
code the texts of earlier written laws, as well as custom and judicial
expressions are merged, together with new policies, into the formal
written text which constitutes a new point of departure for subsequent
interpretation and development.'
The Louisiana legislature has recently placed such a jurisprudential precept
into Louisiana's Civil Code.2 During the 1993 session, the Louisiana Legislature
adopted the Louisiana State Law Institute's Proposed Civil Code article 2502,
which becomes effective January 1, 1995. While the codification of ajurispruden-
tial rule is entirely acceptable under the civilian codal scheme, it is nevertheless
disturbing to learn that this particular Louisiana jurisprudence was developed with
blind eyes toward Louisiana's Civil Code. It was developed primarily through the
adoption of common-law theories and principles. Such an adoption of common-
law solutions in Louisiana for specific problems "must be understood as something
which is appropriate only within the relatively narrow areas where there is no
existing rule of Louisiana law and for which there is no readily accessible answer
in the Louisiana law or in the few familiar foreign civil law materials."3 The
question is then raised: is the adoption of Article 2502 appropriate?
The promulgated article reads:
Art. 2502. Transfer of rights to a thing
A person may transfer to another whatever rights to a thing he may
then have, without warranting the existence of any such rights. In such a
case the transferor does not owe restitution of the price to the transferee
in case of eviction, nor may that transfer be rescinded for lesion.
Such a transfer does not give rise to a presumption of bad faith on the
part of the transferee and is a just title for the purposes of acquisitive
prescription.
Copyright 1994, by LouISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (La. 1986).
2. 1993 La. Acts No. 841, § 1. Act 841 was enacted on suggestion from the Louisiana State
Law Institute through its Proposed Louisiana Civil Code Revision of Sales articles.
3. Joseph Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in Louisiana Civil Code at xi, xxvii (Joseph
Dainow ed., 1947).
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If the transferor acquires ownership of the thing after having
transferred his rights to it, the after-acquired title of the transferor does not
inure to the benefit of the transferee.4
In adopting this article, the legislature purports to codify the jurisprudential
rules established in Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co.,s Read v.
Hewitt," and Land Development Co. v. Schulz.7 These cases recognized the use
of the common-law quitclaim deed in Louisiana jurisdictions and set forth the
rules governing its use.8 Of particular importance in this comment is the rule
that the after-acquired title doctrine shall not apply to a sale by quitclaim deed.9
This comment will briefly discuss the necessity of the quitclaim deed in
Louisiana. It will examine the current law of the quitclaim deed and the after-
acquired title doctrine, and determine whether the language of new Article 2502
is consistent with the jurisprudential principles purportedly codified. This
comment will examine the consistency between new Article 2502 and its
neighboring Civil Code articles. Additionally, a general discussion of quitclaim
deeds will be necessary.
Each article in a code should fit with one another as do the pieces of a
puzzle. The articles must be read and interpreted together. Thus, the question
is posed: does Article 2502 fit?
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 2502
A. Common-Law Application
1. The Quitclaim Deed
The quitclaim deed is of common-law origins. ° The distinguishing
characteristic of a quitclaim deed is that it "purports merely to convey whatever
4. 1993 La. Acts No. 841, § 1. This act contains the entire revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code articles on sales, which becomes effective January 1, 1995.
5. 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947).
6. 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143 (1907) (holding that a quitclaim deed is sufficient to support ten-
year acquisitive prescription). This comment will not address this aspect of new La. Civ. Code art.
2502 (effective January 1, 1995).
7. 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929) (also holding that a quitclaim deed is sufficient to support
ten-year acquisitive prescription). As stated supra note 6, this comment will not address this aspect
of new Article 2502. See new La. Civ. Code art. 2502 cmt. (a) (effective January 1, 1995).
8. One early writer discussed the adequacy of Louisiana's Civil Code warranty articles in
governing matters of conveyance, and attempted to demonstrate that the quitclaim deed is
unnecessary in Louisiana. He argued Louisiana's "at peril and risk" deed achieves the same results
as the quitclaim deed, rendering the quitclaim deed unnecessary in Louisiana. William M. Gordy,
The Legal Effect of Quitclaim Deeds in Louisiana, 23 Tul. L. Rev. 533 (1949).
9. See Waterman, 213 La. at 611-12, 35 So. 2d at 233-34.
10. 3 American Law of Property: A Treatise on the Law of Property in the United States §
12.13, at 223 (A. James Casner ed., 1974).
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title to the particular land the grantor may have, and its use excludes any
implication that he has a good title, or any title at all."" Thus, it transfers only
what interest the grantor may have in the property at the time of the conveyance
with no implied warranty of title.'2
The determination of whether a conveyance is a quitclaim deed is often
difficult. The main factor to consider in labeling a conveyance as a quitclaim
deed or as a form of deed that actually purports to convey property is the .intent
of the parties. Thus, an examination of all of the provisions of the deed, together
with the positions of the parties, should be made to establish the character of the
conveying instrument. 3 Language of the deed does not necessarily determine
its character. For example, the use of the word "quitclaim" in the instrument is
not determinant of a quitclaim deed, 4 nor is the use of the word "grant"
determinant of some other form of deed.'" The use of the words "bargain and
sell" together with "quitclaim" has not been consistently determinant either, 6
nor has the presence of language creating a covenant of warranty. 7 A more
reliable factor to consider in determining the intent of the parties is the price
paid.'8  A nominal or very low price may be indicative of a quitclaim deed.'9
A quitclaim deed may as effectually transfer title to realty as does any other
method of conveyance if the grantor is seized of title at the time of the
conveyance.' Yet, if the grantor has no title or interest at the time of convey-
ance, the quitclaim deed conveys nothing.2'
11. 4 Herbert T. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 959, at 16 (3d ed. 1975).
12. 6A Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 897[11], at 81A-29 (Patrick J. Rohan
ed., 1992).
13. See Williams v. Rabb, 161 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Balch v. Arnold, 59 P. 434
(Wyo. 1899). See also American Law of Property, supra note 10, § 12.44, at 288; Tiffany, supra
note 11, at 17.
14. Wise v. Watts, 239 F. 207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 661, 37 S. Ct. 745 (1917);
Tiffany, supra note 11, at 17.
15. State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771 (S.D. 1900).
16. See Derrick v. Brown, 66 Ala. 162 (1880) (holding that the deed was a quitclaim deed);
Gibson v. Chouteau, 39 Mo. 536 (1866) (holding that such words indicate a quitclaim deed). But
see Touchard v. Crow, 20 Cal. 150 (1862) (holding that such words are not strictly indicative of a
quitclaim deed); D'Wolf v. Haydn, 24 Ill. 526 (1860) (holding that such words do not indicate a
quitclaim deed).
17. See Brown v. Harvey Coal Corp., 49 F.2d 434 (E.D. Ky. 1931); Hunter v. Eastham, 69
S.W. 66 (Tex. 1902); Culmell v. Borroum, 35 S.W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Cummings v.
Dearborn, 56 Vt. 441 (1884).
18. See Eastham v. Hunter, 114 S.W. 97 (Tex. 1908); Carleton v. Lombardi, 16 S.W. 1081
(Tex. 1891); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 (1877); Balch v. Arnold, 59 P. 434 (Wyo. 1899).
19. Balch v. Arnold, 59 P. 434 (Wyo. 1899).
20. Tiffany, supra note 11, at 16.
21. See Chavis v. Hill, 224 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1949); Johnson v. Allen, 285 P.2d 764 (Kan.
1955); Winborn v. Alexander, 279 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954); Grange v. Kayser, 80 S.W.2d
1007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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2. Application of the After-Acquired Title Doctrine to Quitclaim Deeds
The after-acquired tide doctrine represents the well-settled rule that "one
who acquires a title or estate which he has previously conveyed is estopped to
assert his after-acquired tide as against the grantee or his successors." 22 This
rule, in effect, inserts a provision in the deed that it conveys not only the title or
interest possessed by the grantor at the time of its execution, but also the title or
interest he might subsequently acquire.' One limitation to the application of
the after-acquired title doctrine is that a subsequently acquired title will not pass
to the grantee who knew of the grantor's deficiencies.
After-acquired title is applied to estop a grantor from making an adverse
claim against the title of his grantee when the grantor subsequently acquires title
to the property he purportedly conveyed to his grantee by a warranty deed. This
doctrine circumvents what would otherwise be a lengthy and circular judicial
experience-grantor's petitory suit against grantee to be declared owner of the
property, followed by grantee's suit against grantor to enforce grantor's warranty,
and ultimately, the court's declaration that grantee is the owner of the proper-
ty-by simply denying grantor any claim to the property he previously conveyed
and warranted.2 s One court has held the doctrine is based upon the common-
law rule of implied warranties, and thus will apply to a deed which purports to
convey the property regardless of whether an express warranty is present in the
deed.26
The after-acquired title doctrine is generally not applicable at common law
to a conveyance by quitclaim deed. Thus, a grantor who purports to convey only
his present interest will not be estopped from asserting an after-acquired title.27
The rationale is that the grantor purports to pass only his right, title, and interest
that he has at the time of the conveyance, and not any title or interest he may
later acquire. Additionally, after-acquired title operates to pass title only when
what is purportedly conveyed is not conveyed. With a conveyance by a
quitclaim deed, what is purportedly conveyed is in fact conveyed-the right or
interest the grantor has at the time of the conveyance.
Furthermore, there is no implied warranty in a quitclaim deed, whereas the
after-acquired title doctrine operates on the premise that the deed of conveyance
impliedly warrants it is conveying present, as well as future, title. Thus, the
incongruity of these two principles provides the basic reason for the common-law
22. American Law of Property, supra note 10, § 15.19, at 842.
23. See Warburton v. Kieferle, 287 P.2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Meyers v. American Oil Co.,
5 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1941).
24. See Schiltz v. Ferguson, 231 N.W. 358 (Iowa 1930); Flowers v. Crumbaugh, 221 S.W. 1074
(Ky. Ct. App. 1920); Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 259 P.2d 766 (Wyo. 1953).
25. American Law of Property, supra note 10, § 15.19, at 843.
26. Robben v. Obering, 279 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1960).
27. American Law of Property, supra note 10, § 15.19, at 844; Tiffany, supra note 11, § 1231,
at 1106.
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holding that the after-acquired title doctrine does not inure to the benefit of a
grantee under a quitclaim deed.28 Nevertheless, this principle may be limited,
as indicated by the following:
[Tihis principle is applicable only to a deed of bargain and sale by
release or quitclaim, in the strict and proper sense of that species of
conveyance. And therefore, if the deed bears on its face evidence that
the grantors intended to convey, and the grantee expected to become
invested with, an estate of a particular description or quality, and that
the bargain had proceeded upon that footing between the parties, then,
although it may not contain any covenants of title in the technical sense
of the term, still the legal operation and effect of the instrument will be
as binding upon the grantor and those claiming under him, in respect to
the estate thus described, as if a formal covenant to that effect had been
inserted; at least, so far as to estop them from ever afterwards denying
that he was seised of the particular estate at the time of the convey-
ance.
29
While all of the provisions of a conveyance are to be examined in
determining its effect as a quitclaim deed or otherwise, the application of the
after-acquired title doctrine does not depend exclusively upon the presence or
absence of covenants in the deed.30 However, if the covenant is one of further
assurance, or if the deed recites the intention to pass a subsequently acquired
title, such will pass to the grantee of the quitclaim deed.3' Nevertheless, the
general rule remains:
[A] grantor conveying by deed of bargain and sale, by way of release
or quitclaim of all his right and title to a tract of land, if made in good
faith, and without any fraudulent representations, is not responsible for
the goodness of the title beyond the covenants in his deed .... A deed
of this character ... does not operate to pass or bind an interest not
then in existence."
However, this statement must be applied in conjunction with the rule "[w]hatever
the form or nature of the instrument, if it affirms, either by implication or
28. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956).
29. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 297, 322 (1850).
30. See Shumaker v. Johnson, 35 Ind. 33 (1871); Dean v. Doe, 8 Ind. 475 (1856); Hill v.
Coburn, 75 A. 67 (Me. 1909); Wight v. Shaw, 5 Cush. 56 (Mass. 1849); Stoepler v. Silberberg, 119
S.W. 418 (Mo. 1909); Hall v. Chaffee, 14 N.H. 215 (1843).
31. Thornton v. Louch, 130 N.E. 467, 468 (111. 1921) (grantor recited "all right, title and interest
the grantor has or may have") (emphasis added). See also Bennett v. Waller, 23 I11. 97 (1859);
Phelps v. Kellog, 15 111. 135 (1853); McAdams v. Bailey, 82 N.E. 1057 (Ind. 1907); Brenner v. J.J.
Brenner Oyster Co., 292 P.2d 1052 (Wash. 1956); West Seattle Land & Improvement Co. v. Novelty
Mill Co., 72 P. 69 (Wash. 1903).
32. Van Rensselaer, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 322.
19941
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express terms, that the grantor is seized or possessed of a particular estate which
the instrument purports to convey, it will be found an estoppel against the
grantor.,
33
B. Louisiana's Application
1. The Quitclaim Deed
In Louisiana, the codification of the quitclaim deed and the denial of the
application of the after-acquired title doctrine to a quitclaim deed is based on
Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co.Y The disputed conveyance in the
case, which was held to be a quitclaim deed, contained the following language:
[T]he said party of the first part ... has remised, released, sold,
conveyed, and quitclaimed, and by these presents does remise, release,
sell, convey and quit claim unto the said party of the second part, his
heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest, claim, and demand
which said party of the first part has in and to the following described
piece of land .. .
Despite the acknowledgement by the Waterman court that Louisiana's Civil Code
provides no provision for sales by quitclaim deeds, the court decided to
recognize the quitclaim deed 7 It justified its decision stating, "quitclaim deeds
are fully recognized in the jurisprudence and have many times been considered
by our courts. 38
The court in Waterman chose to adopt the common-law definition of a
quitclaim deed: "[Olne which purports to convey, and is understood to convey,
nothing more than the interest or estate in the property described of which the
grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time, rather than the property
itself., 39  The supreme court also followed the common-law method of
determining the character of the conveyance. Citing common-law cases, the
court recognized that an examination must be made of the language and recitals
used in the deed to determine the intent of the parties.' It also recognized that
33. Hamblin v. Woolley, 167 P.2d 100, 104 (Ariz. 1946).
34. 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947). For more recent cases following the principles set forth
in Waterman, see Butler v. Bazemore, 303 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1962); Sabine Prod. Co. v. Guaranty
Bank & Trust Co.. 432 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 438 So. 2d 570 (1983); Franks
Petroleum, Inc. v. Mayo, 438 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 595 (1983);
Freeman v. Turner, 373 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 376 So. 2d 320 (1979); Rycade
Oil Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 129 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
35. Waterman, 213 La. at 598, 35 So. 2d at 229.
36. Id. at 602, 35 So. 2d at 230.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. ld.
40. Id. at 602-03. 35 So. 2d at 230. It has been held that parol evidence may be utilized to
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titling the conveyance a "quitclaim deed" or using the words "bargain and sale"
is not conclusive. 4' Additionally, the Waterman court accepted the common-
law principle that title may be as effectually transferred by a quitclaim deed as
by any other form of conveyance, but only to the extent the grantor had such
title or interest at the time of the conveyance.42 Finally, Waterman recognized
that a quitclaim deed "excludes any implication that [the grantor] has any title
or interest."'43
2. Application of the After-Acquired Title Doctrine to Quitclaim Deeds
The doctrine of after-acquired title is only jurisprudentially present in
Louisiana.' Louisiana recognizes this doctrine when the conveyance is by
warranty deed. Thus, if a defect exists in such a conveyance, or the grantor
lacks title, and the defect is subsequently cured in favor of the grantor, or the
grantor subsequently acquires title, title inures to the benefit of the grantee.45
Waterman recognized this doctrine is actually the enforcement of the grantor's
obligation, under warranty, to deliver a good title."6 Thus, it has been
suggested that the application of the after-acquired title doctrine depends upon
the presence and type of warranty in the conveyance.47
ascertain the true intention of the parties in forming what is purported to be a quitclaim deed, unless
the deed unambiguously indicates the intent of the parties. Freeman v. Turner, 373 So. 2d 732, 735
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 376 So. 2d 320 (1979) (citing McLeroy v. Duckworth, 13 La. Ann.
410 (1858)); Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 211 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
41. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 603, 35 So. 2d 225, 230 (1947).
See also Armstrong v. Bates, 61 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952).
42. See also Osborn v. Johnston, 322 So. 2d 112 (La. 1975); Clifton v. Liner, 552 So. 2d 407
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Sabourin v. Jilek, 128 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Armstrong v.
Bates, 61 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952).
43. Waterman, 213 La. at 604, 35 So. 2d at 230-31. The court notes that despite this principle,
a quitclaim deed is sufficient to support ten-year acquisitive prescription. It rationalizes this by
stating "[t]his jurisprudence is to be regarded as an exception in favor of a good faith possessor
holding under a quitclaim deed for, as a matter of fact, a conveyance of the vendor's title and interest
in property does not convey the property itself." id. at 604-05, 35 So. 2d at 231.
44. The doctrine has developed under La. Civ. Code art. 2452, entitled "Sale of the thing of
another." New La. Civ. Code art. 2452 cmt. (e) (effective January 1, 1995) recognizes this, stating:
Under this Article, the sale of a thing belonging to another becomes valid if the seller
acquires ownership from the true owner before the buyer brings action for nullity. Once
the buyer brings the action, however, the after-acquired title doctrine does not operate, and
ownership thereof does not vest automatically in the buyer.
(citations omitted). See also Sabine Prod. Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 432 So. 2d 1047, 1051
n.5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
45. Rycade Oil Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 129 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
46. Waterman, 213 La. at 611, 35 So. 2d at 233.
47. Gordy, supra note 8. This argument is based upon the statement in Waterman that after-
acquired title may apply to a sale without warranty because of Louisiana's unique warranty system,
wherein a sale without warranty still contains an implied warranty of restitution of price.
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Noting a quitclaim deed excludes any implication of warranty, the Waterman
court, again following common law, stated the doctrine of after-acquired title
does not apply to a quitclaim deed. 4 In additional support of this principle, the
court recognized a quitclaim deed transfers only the grantor's present interest in
the land, and not the land itself. As at common law, it is of great importance to
examine the intent of the parties in the deed to determine whether the after-
acquired title doctrine applies. If it is determined the grantor intends to convey
the land, then the conveyance is not a quitclaim deed, and the doctrine of after-
acquired title is applicable.49
C. Louisiana's Warranty System and the After-Acquired Title Doctrine
Louisiana has a unique system of warranty of title against eviction with three
types of sales: (1) sale with warranty; (2) sale without warranty; and (3) sale at
the buyer's peril and risk. The importation of the quitclaim deed into Louisi-
ana's Civil Code may provide for a fourth type of sale.- The first type, sale
with warranty, is a full warranty deed. It is present when there is an express
promise of warranty or where there is no stipulation against warranty. The
recovery, if the vendee is evicted, is restitution of the price and any other related
costs and damages suffered.5' The after-acquired title doctrine is unquestion-
ably applicable to this type of sale.
The second type of sale in Louisiana is the sale without warranty-an
express stipulation of no warranty. This is different from an express exclusion
of warranty (a non-warranty deed) at common law because Louisiana still implies
a warranty in this type of sale. This implied warranty is provided for in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2505 (revised Civil Code article 2503). If an
eviction occurs, the recovery under this type of warranty is only restitution of the
purchase price." The Waterman court indicated the after-acquired title doctrine
This analogy between the right to restitution of price and the application of the after-acquired title
doctrine is questioned infra part Il.
48. Waterman, 213 La. at 611-12, 35 So. 2d at 233-34. See also Freeman v. Turner, 373 So.
2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 376 So. 2d 320 (1979). Waterman disapproves of the prior
holding in Rapp v. Lowry, 30 La. Ann. 1272 (1878). which applied the doctrine of after-acquired title
to a conveyance by tax deed. The court in Rapp stated that "[i]t is shocking to morals, and to
common honesty and decency, it can not be tolerated in law, that a vendor, even without warranty.
should subsequently acquire a title superior to that which he conveyed to his vendee, and attempt to
oust his vendee under that title." Id at 1275-76. The Waterman court dispensed with this by
labeling it as dicta, and stating that the author of the Rapp court must not have realized the
consequences of the statement. Waterman, 213 La. at 613, 35 So. 2d at 234.
49. Franks Petroleum, Inc. v. Mayo, 438 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 443 So.
2d 595 (1983).
50. Saul Litvinoff and Julio Romanach, Report to Louisiana Law Institute for the Revision of
the Law of Sales (1988).
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 2506. New La. Civ. Code art. 2506 (effective January 1, 1995) does
not purport to change this law.
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 2505. New La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January 1, 1995)
[Vol. 55
COMMENTS
may apply to a sale with this type of warranty, reasoning that it is merely the
enforcement of warranty. 3 Such reasoning is premised on the idea that if a
vendee would be entitled to a restitution of his price, he ought to also receive the
benefit of any after-acquired title that was purportedly conveyed.'
However, one federal court has declined to apply the doctrine of after-
acquired title to a sale without warranty.55 In doing so, the court misinterpreted
the statement in Butler v. Bazemore5 that "[t]he doctrine of after-acquired title
applies only to a vendee holding by a warranty deed. . . ."' It is respectfully
submitted that the Buras court erred in its interpretation and application of
Louisiana's implied warranty. The Buras court stated that Butler implies the
after-acquired title doctrine does not apply when warranty is expressly excluded.
However, Butler does not make such an implication; on the contrary, it notes the
peculiarity of Louisiana's implied warranty and recognizes the after-acquired title
doctrine will apply when an implied warranty is present. In Louisiana, warranty
is implied even when the deed expressly states there is no warranty.58 Thus,
the after-acquired titled doctrine should apply to a sale without warranty.
Additionally, Buras rejects the idea that because restitution of price is
available, one should also receive the benefit of after-acquired title. Buras has
not been followed, nor cited by any Louisiana courts. Accordingly, the
parallelism of entitlement to restitution of price and the application of the after-
acquired title doctrine has been recognized by later courts.59
The third type of sale in Louisiana is the "at peril and risk" sale. It is
present when: (1) the parties agree to exclude warranty and the buyer is aware
of the danger of eviction; (2) the buyer states he is buying at his own peril and
risk; or (3) the seller's obligation of returning the price has been expressly
excluded. 60 This is a true non-warranty deed, and the vendee is not entitled to
states:
The warranty of title against eviction is implied in every sale. Nevertheless, the parties
may agree to increase or to limit the warranty. They may also agree to an exclusion of
the warranty, but even in that case the seller must return the price to the buyer if eviction
occurs, unless it is clear that the buyer was aware of the danger of eviction, or the buyer
has declared that he was buying at his peril and risk, or the seller's obligation of returning
the price has been expressly excluded.
(emphasis added).
53. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 611, 35 So. 2d 225, 233 (1947).
See also Franks Petroleum, Inc. v. Mayo, 438 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 443 So.
2d 595 (1983).
54. See Gordy, supra note 8, at 541.
55. United States v. Bums, 458 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. 303 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1962).
57. Id. at 194.
58. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2503 and 2505, and new La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January
1, 1995).
59. See Freeman v. Turner, 373 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 376 So. 2d 320
(1979). See also Gordy, supra note 8, at 541.
60. See new La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January 1, 1995). This article changes the "and"
1994]
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recover anything in the case of eviction. The after-acquired title doctrine does
not apply to this type of warranty.6' Note, however, this principle is question-
able, as indicated later in this comment.62
It has been suggested that a quitclaim deed is nothing more than an "at peril
and risk" sale. 63 Therefore, the reason given for the refusal to apply the after-
acquired title doctrine to a quitclaim deed is the same as that given for a sale at
the buyer's peril and risk: because restitution of the price is denied. The
soundness of classifying a quitclaim.deed into this third type of sale is certainly
called into doubt by the placement of an additional article governing the
quitclaim deed in Louisiana's Civil Code. Thus, the quitclaim deed may provide
for a fourth type of sale in Louisiana, and there may be a different rationale for
not applying the after-acquired title doctrine to a quitclaim deed than that used
with the other types of sale.
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Fourth Type of Sale
A quitclaim deed differs from a sale at the buyer's peril and risk; the former
purports to convey the vendor's present rights or interests in the property, while
the latter purports to convey the property itself.6 The respective articles
governing both forms of conveyance state that the grantor does not owe a
between "danger of eviction" and "purchased at his peril and risk" in La. Civ. Code art. 2505 to an
"or." However, this does not change the law. For an explanation, see New Orleans & C.R.R. v.
Jourdain's Heirs, 34 La. Ann. 648 (1882).
61. Freeman v. Turner, 373 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 376 So. 2d 320 (1979).
62. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
63. Gordy, supra note 8, at 543.
64. One court has recently stated an important effect of this difference that should be
mentioned. The third circuit in Simmesport State Bank v. Roy, 614 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993), held the public records doctrine (La. R.S. 9:2721 and 9:2756 (1991)) does not apply to a
quitclaim deed. The public records doctrine requires all contracts affecting immovables to b e
recorded to affect third parties. The court reasoned that because the grantor issued the quitclaim deed
to the defendants subsequent to the sale to the plaintiff, the grantor had no interest that could pass
to the defendant (grantee of the quitclaim deed), regardless of whether the defendant recorded before
or after the plaintiff. Simmesport State Bank, 614 So. 2d at 267-68.
This holding is questionable. First, the court stated there is no jurisprudence that requires
application of the public records doctrine to a quitclaim deed. Id. at 267. However, the court
apparently overlooked Williams v. White Castle Lumber & Shingle Co., 114 La. 448, 38 So. 414
(1905), which held a prior unrecorded conveyance is not effective against a subsequently acquired,
but previously recorded quitclaim deed. Second, the majority common-law rule is that a recorded
quitclaim deed will prevail over a prior unrecorded deed. See Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 21. 13
S. Ct. 426 (1893), which is cited in the comments to new Article 2502 (effective January 1, 1995),
and Wilhelm v. Wilken, 44 N.E. 82 (N.Y. 1896). See also Tiffany, supra note 11, § 1277, at 39;
American Law of Property, supra note 10, § 17.16, at 585. This rule is consistent with the public
records doctrine in Louisiana and should be followed.
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restitution of price in the event of eviction.' It is this similarity, which existed
jurisprudentially prior to the adoption of new Article 2502, that undoubtedly
prompted the belief the quitclaim deed is unnecessary in Louisiana.66
There are, however, justifications for the presence of the quitclaim deed in
Louisiana. An examination of the codal structure of the revised Louisiana Civil
Code articles on sales, effective January 1, 1995, may lead to the determination
that new Article 25027 is to be utilized only to release an interest in property.
However, a study of the history of this article reveals it is intended to operate as
a means of conveyance. It provides a fourth type of conveyance; the conveyance
of the grantor's present rights or interests in the property. This is different from
a mere release; it is capable of transferring the property itself if the grantor is
seized of the property at the time of the execution of the deed. A release does
not transfer; it only prevents the grantor from challenging any title in which he
has purportedly released his interest.
The application of Louisiana Civil Code article 1983, which requires all
contracts be performed in good faith, helps elucidate the necessity of the
quitclaim deed in Louisiana. If this article is properly observed, an exclusion of
warranty in a deed purporting to convey property will be null if the seller is in
bad faith at the time of the execution of the deed. Bad faith will exist even if
the seller communicates to the buyer that he is not the owner," and yet, the
buyer still insists on the deed. Bad faith results because the seller purports to
convey something he knowingly does not own.
However, a grantor of a quitclaim deed can execute such a deed under these
same circumstances and not be deemed in bad faith. His limited liability, i.e.,
complete non-warranty, is not voided. This dichotomy exists because the grantor
of the quitclaim deed only purports to convey whatever present interests he may
have in the property; he does not purport to convey the property itself. He is not
purporting to sell something which he knowingly does not own.
This conveyance is analogous to the sale of a hope.' For example, if a
civil or corporeal possessor who occupies land he knowingly does not own is
approached by an individual who desires to obtain title and clear all claims
against that property, the possessor cannot, in good faith, execute any type of
deed that purports to convey the actual property, whether by warranty or not.
He can, however, execute a quitclaim deed after stating he does not own the
65. New La. Civ. Code arts. 2502 (effective January 1, 1995) (governing the quitclaim deed)
and 2503 (effective January 1, 1995) (governing the "at peril and risk" sale).
66. Gordy, supra note 8, at 544 (concluding the results achieved by the quitclaim deed can as
effectively be reached through the use of Louisiana's "at peril and risk" sale).
67. This article is titled "Transfer of rights to a thing" and is a codal recognition of the
quitclaim deed.
68. This is distinguishable from a communication by the grantor that he has a doubt as to his
claim to the ownership of the property. This involves a certain and affirmative belief that he has no
claim to the ownership of the property.
69. Litvinoff & Romanach, supra note 50, at 40 (stating it is the sale of the right to something
uncertain to exist).
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property. The quitclaim deed provides a form of conveyance which enables the
grantee to quiet any possible claims the grantor may have to the property, while
at the same time enabling him to acquire grantor's present interest in the
property. Because of the inadequacy and disarray of the public records, a
grantee may choose to purchase a quitclaim deed from a grantor, despite the
grantor's insistence he has no ownership interest in the property. The quitclaim
deed provides the grantee the opportunity to do so, while at the same time
protecting the grantor from any invalidation of non-warranty due to his bad
faith.7"
Though, when the seller is not in bad faith, the same result might be
achieved by the use of a sale at the buyer's peril and risk, the quitclaim deed
provides a manner of conveyance more consistent with the theory of "cause."'"
A quitclaim deed allows individuals to express their true intentions in transacting
for whatever interests the grantor may have to a certain described property,
whereas a sale at the buyer's peril and risk openly purports to convey the entire
property, while expressing doubt as to grantor's ownership interest. A quitclaim
deed may be more appropriate than a sale at the buyer's peril and risk when the
grantor, in good faith, doubts either the extent or the existence of his ownership
interest. A quitclaim deed would express this doubt, whereas a conveyance that
purports to convey the actual property would be a false statement of the parties'
cause.
Despite the foregoing rationale, there is a more practical reason for the
addition of the quitclaim deed as a fourth type of sale in Louisiana-the
quitclaim deed is widely used in Louisiana by its practitioners and recognized by
its courts. The drafters of Louisiana's laws have chosen to address this reality
by adopting new Article 2502 to govern the use of the quitclaim deed. By doing
so, the drafters have preserved the civilian concept of governance of general
principles of law by a code. Though the jurisprudence addresses the matter, it
is far more consistent with Louisiana's legal system to have a provision for this
principle in the Louisiana Civil Code. The structure of a civil code causes
articles within the code to effect the interpretation and meaning of other articles.
Thus, the articles must be compatible and lead to consistent interpretations. The
remaining sections will evaluate and discuss the compatibility of new Article
2502 with the other Civil Code articles.
B. Louisiana's Warranty Articles: Fitting in the Quitclaim Deed Article
Waterman followed the common-law jurisdictions when it stated that a
conveyance by a quitclaim deed excludes any implication that the grantor has
70. Interview with Professor Saul Litvinoff, Reporter for the Louisiana Law Institute for the
Proposed Louisiana Civil Code Revision of Sales, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 13, 1993).
71. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
[Vol. 55
COMMENTS
any title or interest.72 This, in essence, states there is no warranty with a
quitclaim deed. The codification apparently adopts this principle by providing
the grantee of a conveyance by quitclaim deed is not entitled to a restitution of
the price. This may, however, be inconsistent with Louisiana warranty because
of the implied warranty present in this state. Recall there are three forms of
Louisiana conveyances, other than the quitclaim deed, wherein implied warranty,
and thus, restitution of price, can be avoided. They are the following: (1) a sale
expressing non-warranty and containing the presence of knowledge by the vendee
of the danger of eviction; (2) a sale stating it is at the buyer's peril and risk; and
(3) a sale expressly providing there will be no restitution of the price.73 The
denial of restitution of price to the grantee of a quitclaim deed by operation of
law apparently provides another situation wherein implied warranty is excluded.
This is done, similar to a purchase at the buyer's peril and risk, without a
determination of the buyer's knowledge of the danger of eviction.
As noted earlier, however, the mere use of the word "quitclaim" in the deed
is insufficient alone to qualify the act as a quitclaim deed. A preliminary step
to labeling a conveyance a quitclaim deed is the ascertainment of each party's
intent in entering into the agreement. If the court determines the parties intended
the effects of a quitclaim deed, it is also determining the vendee had knowledge
.of the danger of eviction, as uncertainty of title is one of the reasons for use of
the quitclaim deed. The knowledge of the vendee needs to be examined to
determine whether Louisiana's implied warranty has been excluded, i.e., whether
the parties intended a quitclaim deed. If this is done in practice, the quitclaim
deed in new Article 2502 may well conform to Louisiana's present warranty
system, which only denies implied warranty when the buyer has knowledge of
the danger of eviction or when the conveyance states "at buyer's peril and risk."
However, if this is not practiced, this article has added a new form for excluding
implied warranty by the use of magic words and without an examination of the
buyer's knowledge of the danger of eviction.
Whether the quitclaim deed conforms to Louisiana's present warranty system
or creates a new principle, the reason for the denial of use of the after-acquired
title doctrine with the quitclaim deed is not based solely on a warranty/restitution
of price analysis. This proposition is supported by the inclusion of express
language, not found in the other conveyance articles, denying application of the
after-acquired title doctrine to a conveyance by a quitclaim deed.74 Following
the common-law relationship of a quitclaim deed and the after-acquired title
doctrine, Waterman stated the primary reason for not extending the doctrine of
after-acquired title to a quitclaim deed: "[A] conveyance of that character
transfers only the present interest of the vendor in the land and does not convey
72. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 603, 35 So. 2d 225, 230 (1947).
73. New La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January 1, 1995).
74. "If the transferor acquires ownership of the thing after having transferred his rights to it,
the after-acquired title of the transferor does not inure to the benefit of the transferee." New La. Civ.
Code art. 2502 (effective January 1, 1995).
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the property. 7 5 Therefore, what was purportedly conveyed-an interest-was
in fact conveyed, and the vendee should not be entitled to something more than
was bargained for, i.e., an after-acquired title. A right was purchased and
received, though it may not contain the right to the property. With a sale at the
buyer's peril and risk, however, the buyer has not received what he purportedly
purchased-the property, and he should receive any after-acquired title.
It is important to recall that the mere labeling of a conveyance is not
conclusive.76 A determination of the true form of the conveyance is necessary
to determine the applicability of the after-acquired title doctrine.77
C. Warranty of Vendor's Acts
1. Non-Quitclaim Deeds
"In all those cases the seller is liable for an eviction that is occasioned by
his own act, and any agreement to the contrary is null,""8 "Warranty against
the vendor's acts," another form of warranty against eviction, is a different type
of warranty than the various forms of warranty of title previously discussed. The
former can never be excluded, whereas the latter may be. This "warranty against
the vendor's acts" is based upon the maxim: "Quem de evictione tenet actio,
eundem agentem repellit exceptio," or "He who warrants cannot evict., 79 This
has been interpreted to mean the vendor cannot evict his buyer by exercising an
action in revindication or any other real action against him.' For example, if
the vendor did not own the thing at the time of the sale, but he subsequently
acquires ownership thereof by some means, or if he dies and the real owner of
75. Waterman, 213 La. at 611, 35 So. 2d at 233.
76. Id. at 603, 35 So. 2d at 230. See also Armstrong v. Bates, 61 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1952).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 34-51.
78. New La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January 1, 1995). This article provides in full:
The warranty against eviction is implied in every sale. Nevertheless, the parties may
agree to increase or to limit the warranty. They may also agree to an exclusion of the
warranty, but even in that case the seller must return the price to the buyer if eviction
occurs, unless it is clear that the buyer was aware of the danger of eviction, or the buyer
has declared that he was buying at his peril and risk, or the seller's obligation of returning
the price has been expressly excluded.
In all those cases the seller is liable for an eviction that is occasioned by his own act,
and any agreement to the contrary is null.
The buyer is subrogated to the rights in warranty of the seller against other persons,
even when the warranty is excluded.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 2504 (1870): "Although it be agreed that the seller is not subject to
warranty, he is, however, accountable for what results from his personal act; and any contrary
agreement is void."
79. 2 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law § 1473, at 825 (Louisiana
State Law Institute trans., West 1959) (1939).
80. Id.
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the thing is his successor, the "warranty against the vendor's acts" will prevent
the vendor or his successor, as the case may be, from exercising a real action
against the buyer.8
It has been stated that the doctrine of after-acquired title developed as a
method of enforcing the vendor's warranty against eviction, and, therefore, the
doctrine should only apply when the vendee would be entitled to a restitution of
price.82 The court in Freeman v. Turnerg3 stated this principle in the negative:
Since the presence of a non-warranty deed, coupled either with the
vendee's knowledge of the danger of eviction or a stipulation that the
vendee purchases at his peril and risk, will relieve the vendor of liability
for restitution of the price, the doctrine of after-acquired title should not
apply to either situation."
This general statement overlooks the principle of warranty against eviction from
the vendor's own acts, which should require the application of the after-acquired
title doctrine. When the vendor has purported to transfer the property, "warranty
against the vendor's acts" should prevent the vendor or his heirs from challeng-
ing the title of his vendee or his vendee's assigns, regardless of the type of
warranty of title present.83  Additionally, it should also prevent the vendor's
assigns from challenging the title. The vendor purported to convey the title to
the vendee, therefore, he should not be able to obtain, nor sell, that title to the
detriment of his vendee, and any such act should be null.s6 If the vendor
subsequently acquires the thing he previously purported to sell, the application
of the after-acquired title doctrine would serve to uphold the "warranty against
the vendor's acts." It should be applied to all deeds that purport to convey the
property, warranty and non-warranty deeds alike. By passing title to the buyer,
the vendor himself would be prevented from disturbing the buyer's possession,
or from disturbing the buyer's possession by conveying to some third party who
may challenge the buyer's title.
81. Id
82. Gordy, supra note 8, at 541 (citing Childs v. United States, 5 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1925), and
Avery v. Allain, I1 Rob. 436 (La. 1845)).
83. 373 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
84. Id at 734.
85. See Planiol & Ripert, supra note 79, §§ 1471-1472, at 824. Section 1471 provides: "The
vendor, having engaged himself by the sale to procure the enjoyment of the thing for the buyer and
to give him title, can do nothing in contravention of this obligation, either by disturbing the buyer
in his possession, or by trying to take the thing away." Section 1472 provides in pertinent part:
"This is so even in case of a simple disturbance in fact, which is not actionable if committed by a
third person."
86. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The Waterman court also added support
to this theory by stating that "it might be argued that the vendor would be precluded from
subsequently acquiring an adverse title to the prejudice of the vendee under Article 2504 of the Civil
Code." Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 611, 35 So. 2d 225, 233 (1947).
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2. Quitclaim Deeds
Does the warranty against the vendor's (grantor's) acts apply to a quitclaim
deed? In the revised sales articles, "warranty against the vendor's acts" is
contained in the same article, revised Article 2503, as the other warranties
against eviction, i.e., warranties of title, applicable to non-quitclaim deed
conveyances."7 The article governing quitclaim deeds, revised Article 2502,
precedes this article, and contains no provision for "warranty against the vendor's
acts.""8 Under the pre-revisionary structure, the "warranty against the vendor's
acts" was in an article by itself,8' which preceded the article governing the
application and exclusion of warranty of title against eviction.90 The use of
strict codal construction leads one to conclude that by placing the "warranty
against the vendor's acts" in the same revisionary article with the other warranty
provisions for non-quitclaim deed conveyances, and at the same time providing
no such "warranty against the vendor's acts" in the revisionary article governing
quitclaim deeds, such warranty does not apply to a sale by quitclaim deed.
Prior to the adoption of the revised sales articles, however, a few courts did
apply the "warranty against the vendor's acts" to a sale by quitclaim deed. The
court in Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie" stated that pre-revisionary Article
2504 (revised Article 2503) prevented the vendor or his heirs from asserting any
interest adverse to the vendee or his assigns. 2 Rapp v. Lowry,93 involving a
conveyance by a tax deed, stated that an exclusion of warranty preventing
restitution* of price does not release the grantor of a quitclaim deed from
responsibility for his own disturbances. Both Cattle Farms, Inc. and Rapp
involved litigation wherein the original grantor or his heirs, and not assigns of
the grantor, were parties. This is a distinguishing factor from Waterman, where
the parties to the suit were successors at the end of an extensive chain of title,
and were not heirs of the original parties. Thus, despite Waterman's disapproval
of Rapp, prior to the revision of the sales articles it could have been argued that
the after-acquired title doctrine was applicable to a quitclaim deed to enforce the
"warranty against the vendor's acts" when the dispute involved the original
grantor or his heirs. This would have suggested the holding of Waterman-that
the doctrine of after-acquired title does not apply to a quitclaim deed-was
overly broad. However, the codal structure of the revised sales articles refutes
any implication that the "warranty against the vendor's acts" or the after-acquired
title doctrine applies to a quitclaim deed.
87. New La. Civ. Code art. 2503 (effective January 1. 1995).
88. New La. Civ. Code art. 2502 (effective January 1. 1995).
89. La. Civ. Code art. 2504.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2505.
91. 211 So. 2d 354, 362 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
92. See also Rodgers v. CNG Producing Co., 528 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Yelverton,
J., dissenting), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 180 (1988).
93. 30 La. Ann. 1272 (1878).
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The application of the after-acquired title doctrine to a quitclaim deed is a
contradiction: the former implies the conveyance includes future acquisitions,
whereas the latter conveys only present interests. Because of this contradiction,
the use of the after-acquired title doctrine to enforce the obligation of "warranty
against the vendor's acts," as was suggested with the other types of conveyances,
is not proper, nor is it necessary, under conveyances by a quitclaim deed. The
"warranty against the vendor's acts" should not apply to a quitclaim deed as long
as both parties were in good faith and in agreement that only the vendor's
interests in the property at the time of the act were being transferred. It should
not prevent the grantor from acquiring and maintaining or conveying a
subsequently acquired interest, as the doctrine of after-acquired title would so
preclude.
With a quitclaim deed, the grantor conveys to his grantee his present interest
in the property at the time of the conveyance. When the grantor later conveys
a subsequently acquired title, in which he previously had no interest, to a third
party, he is conveying something different than he previously conveyed to the
grantee of the quitclaim deed. Thus, it is acceptable for the grantor of a
quitclaim deed to subsequently acquire an interest in the same property he had
previously, in good faith, quitclaimed. In the final analysis, it is submitted that
the denial of application of the after-acquired title doctrine to a quitclaim deed,
as stated in new Article 2502, is consistent with the article providing for the
warranty of the vendor's acts.
D. Warranty of Assignment of a Right: Existence of the Right
New Louisiana Civil Code article 2646 states that "[t]he assignor of a right
warrants its existence at the time of the assignment." The predecessors to this
article 4 stated that "[hie who sells a credit or an incorporeal right, warrants its
existence at the time of the transfer though no warranty be mentioned in the
deed." This indicates an implied warranty imposed by this article. 9  The'
comments to the revised article indicate the new article does not change the
law;' thus, this implied warranty is present in the revised article as well.
Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has approved the doctrine of implied
warranty in conveyances of incorporeal rights.97 Therefore, implied warranty
under new Article 2646 is recognized in Louisiana.
Does this implied warranty of new Article 2646 apply to quitclaim deeds?
New Article 2502 is titled "Transfer of rights to a thing," and governs the use
of the quitclaim deed. The comments to the article state that it is an assignment
94. La. Civ. Code arts. 2646 and 2647.
95. See Deas v. Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So. 2d 270 (1943); Lemoine v. City of Shreveport, 184
La. 221, 165 So. 873 (1936); Lockwood Oil Co. v. Atkins, 158 La. 610, 104 So. 386 (1925).
96. New La. Civ. Code art. 2646 cmt. (a) (effective January 1, 1995).
97. Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 967, 181 So. 458, 460-61 (1938).
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of rights without warranty." Thus, revised Article 2646, warranty of assign-
ment of rights, would not apply to a quitclaim deed, due to the limitation of no
warranty imposed by the comment to revised Article 2502.
This limitation is well-founded. Warranty against eviction, express and
implied, is apparently avoided by the use of the quitclaim deed," and therefore,
the implied warranty of revised Article 2646 would also be avoided for the same
reasons-an awareness by both parties that the grantor may not have title or
rights to the property. The court in Tomlinson v. Thurmon stated:
[A]rticle 2505 [new Article 2503] which declares that even in case of
the stipulation of no warranty, the seller, in case of eviction, is liable to
restitution of the price, unless the buyer was aware, at the time of the
sale of the danger of eviction, and purchased at his peril and risk.
Article 2505 applies not only to the sale of corporeal things, but also to
the sale of debts, or incorporeal rights [new Article 2646]."°
Therefore, warranty can be excluded in an assignment of a right just as it can be
with conveyances of property. This warranty is excluded by the use of a
quitclaim deed.
Accordingly, the presence of provisions for the quitclaim deed in the Civil
Code is not in conflict with the warranty of assignment of rights. The implied
warranty imposed on an assignment of a right is not operative against a quitclaim
deed; therefore, it does not affect the application of the after-acquired title
doctrine under a quitclaim deed.
IV. CONCLUSION
New Civil Code article 2502, effective January 1, 1995, is different from a
non-warranty deed or a deed at the buyer's peril and risk. The former purports
to sell the grantor's present rights in the property, while the latter two purport to
convey the property itself. Therefore, this article provides a fourth type of
conveyance in Louisiana. The key to determining the type of conveyance is in
the language of the deed, which indicates the intent of the parties. If it is
determined that the parties intended to convey and receive only the rights to the
property, a quitclaim deed is present; however, if the parties intended to convey
and receive the property itself, the deed is one of the other forms of conveyance.
The quitclaim deed fits into Louisiana's warranty system without conflict.
Two alternative suggestions are advanced in support of this conclusion. First,
the determination that the deed is a quitclaim involves the ascertainment that the
grantee has knowledge of the danger of eviction. Therefore, it is consistent with
the warranty principle to deny price restitution when the grantee has knowledge
98. New La. Civ. Code art. 2502 cmt. (c) (effective January 1, 1995).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74 and 87-93.
100. Tomlinson, 189 La. at 968-69, 181 So. at 461.
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of the danger of eviction. Second, the use of the quitclaim deed provides another
form of express language for denying restitution of price, like the "at peril and
risk" deed, without an examination of the grantee's knowledge. The first
approach is more likely the correct one, and more consistent with the present
codal warranty system.
The denial of the application of the after-acquired title doctrine to a
quitclaim deed is consistent with the principle of a quitclaim deed and with the
articles of Louisiana's Civil Code. The primary reason for the denial is that the
after-acquired title doctrine requires an implication that a future interest is
conveyed, whereas the very nature of a quitclaim deed denies such an implica-
tion.
The courts have also advanced a warranty against eviction analysis in
denying application of the after-acquired title doctrine, analogizing a quitclaim
deed to an "at peril and risk" deed, and denying after-acquired title because
restitution of price is denied.' Yet, in light of the "warranty against the
vendor's acts," application of the after-acquired title doctrine should extend to
all conveyances where the vendor purports to convey the property itself,
regardless of the right to restitution of price. After-acquired title, however,
should not apply to a quitclaim deed because the grantor conveyed what he
purported to convey-a right.
Finally, the implied warranty of the existence of the right transferred (revised
Article 2646) is avoided by the use of a quitclaim deed. Thus, new Article 2646
has no effect on new Article 2502.
In the final analysis, Article 2502, effective January 1, 1995, conforms to the
principles set forth in the cases it purports to codify, and with the surrounding
Louisiana Civil Code articles. Thus, it is a true codification. The piece fits.
Gregory Michael Anding
101. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 611, 35 So. 2d 225, 233 (1947);
Gordy, supra note 8, at 541.
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